Wouldn't this be good - a European high-readiness army, the states' own combat forces, regional and local defense forces.

Wouldn't this be good - a European high-readiness army, the states' own combat forces, regional and local defense forces.

The European high-readiness forces would consist of a special forces brigade sent by each country - excluding Finland, which would send trainers and no other troops - for these reasons: the defense of the long Russian border, Finland's training and expertise is high.

The expertise of the Finnish army and the European readiness forces can be combined like this - the special forces brigades of different countries would be recyclable in 4-month periods - during which time they would receive Finnish military training and thus take the expertise back to their home countries in the recycling.

The European high-readiness forces would be stationed in bases across Europe - from where they could reach a conflict point in days.

In this way, Europe would have a high level of ultra-rapid defense readiness and at the same time constantly growing military expertise - for which Ukrainian drone expertise training could also be requested.

Thus, this unproductive European defense spending debate turns into a rapid increase in operational readiness - which does not even significantly increase costs.

Why.

Because the weapon and the soldier using it as an economic expense are in direct causal connection with the effectiveness of the weapon and soldier's use.

The way Ukraine uses drones is a prime example of this - the way Venezuela used the billion-dollar missiles it bought from Russia is a bottom quote on the same thing.

So - the core of economic efficiency is the training and competent use of soldiers' skills.

And the path to this lies through Europe's highly-readily recyclable forces.